










































































d.Boost, Control, or Both of Korean Housing Market:
831 Countermeasures
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Abstract: Although the Korean government reported a housing supply ratio of more than 100% in the early 2000s, regional and class
disparities in the Korean housing sector have not been correspondingly alleviated. Unfortunately, many Korean households are still
enduring the economic burden caused by cyclical price variation, while many housing construction companies are on the verge of
bankruptcy. To resolve the ever-expanding socioeconomic problems in the housing and real estate sector, the current Korean government
proposed 831 Countermeasures, which has since met with much controversy. In an effort to address these issues, this paper utilizes a
qualitative system dynamics model to elucidate and interrogate complex Korean housing mechanisms. By mapping bibliographical and
experimental knowledge with causal loop diagrams, the positive and adverse effects of the 831 Countermeasures are also analyzed.
Finally, based on the research findings, alternative policy guidelines are proposed that can be used to strengthen positive housing
structures and obviate negative ones.
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The Korean War 1950–1953 not only devastated Korea’s terri-
tories, but also resulted in an extreme shortage of urban infra-
structure, not to mention housing. Since the war, the Korean
government has adopted diverse urban policies in order to accom-
modate huge in-migration toward the capital region, especially
Seoul. Nevertheless, such policies have also exacerbated urban
problems. Furthermore, over the last four to five decades, un-
precedented economic growth has fundamentally changed Ko-
rea’s housing industry. Under such circumstances, the so-called
“speculative group” has dared to pursue windfall incomes from
the housing and real-estate sector. Ultimately, all of these factors
have contributed to the aggravation of a wide range of social
problems.
There are several reasons that home ownership is a key and
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J. Constr. Eng. Manage. 2safe form of property investment. However, in Korea, because
increases in house prices have far surpassed increases in income,
imputed and even effective demand have been easily converted
into speculative demand. Therefore, it is almost inevitable that
house price bubbles have become ubiquitous in the Korean hous-
ing market. Also, the Korean government’s direct and indirect
involvement and interference in the housing market have often
caused a series of negative effects.
Indeed, even though the Korean government recorded a hous-
ing supply ratio of more than 100% in the early 2000s, this figure
does not correlate with a decrease in regional and class disparities
in the Korean housing sector. In fact, cyclical price variation con-
tinues to negatively impact many Korean households, while
many housing construction companies are nearing bankruptcy. To
cope with these increasing socioeconomic problems, the current
Korean government announced a comprehensive real-estate
program—dubbed “831 Countermeasures”—on August 31, 2005.
However, this initiative-based program has incited a barrage of
arguments in favor of, and against, its proposals. Notably, most of
these arguments are predominantly based on subjective reasoning
and anecdotal evidence.
This paper, on the other hand, examines the impact of the 831
Countermeasures through a qualitative lens by applying an exist-
ing theory of comprehensive housing dynamics to Korea’s diverse
housing mechanisms. Then, by mapping pertinent bibliographical
and experimental knowledge with causal loop diagrams, this re-
search develops a Korean housing market dynamics model. This
model is based on universal housing market models; however, it
is also constructed to reflect the specific characteristics of Korea’s
housing supply. Through this approach, the positive and adverse
effects of the 831 Countermeasures are analyzed. Finally, based
on the research findings, alternative policy guidelines are outlined















































































Several studies have been conducted on housing price determi-
nants and housing price models. Englund et al. 1999 provided a
unique methodology for computing housing price indexes in an
attempt to understand the effect of temporal aggregation upon
estimates of housing prices and their volatilities. Guirguis et al.
2005 employed alternative estimation methodologies in which
the parameters are allowed to vary over time in order to predict
housing prices. Using quantile regression, Zietz et al. 2008 sug-
gested determinants of house prices that contribute to observed
variations in the estimated prices of housing characteristics. How-
ever, only a few influenced factors were considered in these stud-
ies. Moreover, it is difficult to apply housing policies to the price
models.
Also, there are a handful of studies that examine housing mar-
ket and housing policy analysis. Kim 2004 explored the nexus
between housing and the Korean economy, focusing on house
price, inflation, housing investment, and government intervention.
Cho and Ma 2006 identified the long-term relationship between
housing values and interest rates in the Korean housing market
using the cointegration test and spectral analysis. As well, Park
et al. 2008 demonstrated the effectiveness of bank lending re-
strictions and analyzed the relationship between bank lending and
apartment prices using real data. However, these studies con-
ducted their analysis using empirical approaches with only a few
factors, instead of considering diverse perspectives.
System Dynamics Modeling
System Dynamics SD is a modeling tool that provides an un-
derstanding of strategic problems in complex dynamic systems.
An SD model provides system users with insight into the feed-
back processes and dynamic behavior of a system. This model
is made up of feedback loops and their variables, which are
known as causal loop diagrams or influence diagrams. Feedback
loops can be divided into two categories: 1 a balancing loop
which is a goal seeking structure of the system that causes bal-
ance and stability and 2 a reinforcing loop which generates a
growth process in which action builds a result that generates still
greater action Ahmad and Simonovic 2000. System dynamics
modeling is used in this study because it enables a comprehensive
solution and systematic approach to analyze the impact of hous-
ing policies.
Real Estate Policies and 831 Countermeasures
Korean Real Estate Policies
From the early 1960s to the late 1990s, real-estate prices cycli-
cally skyrocketed as Korea experienced rapid urbanization and
industrialization. In the late 1990s in particular, price increases in
the real estate sector related to land, housing, and Chonsei in
Korean, “Chonsei” refers to the lease of a house or room on a
deposit basis; that is, a lessee can rent a house or room with a
large deposit were astonishing. Consequently, in late 1997, the
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to escape from the so-called “foreign currency crisis.” More re-
cently, as both effective and speculative demand have comingled
in the marketplace, housing problems have become even more
complicated. While the Korean government has often depended
on the “invisible hand” as delineated by Adam Smith, more
recently, to cope with this aggravated situation, the Korean
government has not hesitated to expand the reach of its housing
policies.
Nonetheless, most of these government-initiated real-estate or
housing policies have come under heavy attack, and have often
been criticized as being superficial and merely palliative because
they generally have a lesser impact and shorter duration than
market-driven initiatives. In particular, opponents of government-
initiated housing policies have argued that although the spillover
effects of antispeculation policies usually disappear within 2–3
years, the unforeseen negative effects, which can arise over the
same period, can become rampant if unchecked. Indeed, when the
Korean government implemented a series of housing policies
from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, adequate attention was not
given to the potential adverse effects of these policies.
Unfortunately, government mismanagement of this sort has be-
come a trend. For example, from 1997 to 2000, approximately 10
types of housing policies were implemented as economy-boosting
measures. In contrast, from 2002 to 2003, the Korean government
prepared 13 countermeasures and 16 actions targeted solely
against antispeculation policies Kim and Lee 2005. Stridently
opposing speculation, the government has performed tax investi-
gations, crackdowns, and transaction moratoria. In light of the
acute nature of Korea’s housing problems, these government mea-
sures seem inevitable. However, it must be acknowledged that
such intervention has contributed to increased uncertainty in the
housing market. Indeed, in retrospect, it can be observed that the
government’s antispeculation and price normalization policies
have not been consistently maintained, sometimes even fueling
price increases. For instance, government announcements have
not always been congruent with market cycles, as demonstrated
by the Korean government’s tendency to hastily publicize anti-
speculation measures which are swiftly followed by the proposal
of economy-boosting measures.
831 Countermeasures
On August 31, 2005, the Korean government announced a set of
comprehensive real-estate programs called 831 Countermeasures.
These government initiatives were founded on the assumption
that former housing policies are overly skewed toward supply or
demand and therefore are only useful in the short term. These
initiatives propose to maintain economic balance by: 1 increas-
ing tax bases for real-estate purchases, capital gains, and transac-
tions; 2 discouraging speculative demand; and 3 expanding the
supply of public residential lots and apartment complexes. As
shown in Table 1, the 831 Countermeasures are specifically aimed
at maintaining middle class residential stability, enhancing trans-
parency in real-estate transactions, controlling speculative de-
mand, and expanding both housing stocks and residential lots.
Policy Model Development
Here, the status quo of the Korean housing market and the pro-
con debates circling the 831 Countermeasures are explained and
represented by a series of causal loops. For these purposes, it is











































































d.assumed that the housing market is composed of the dynamic
interaction between three key components: housing supply, de-
mand, and price. This is not only a generally accepted concept in
the Korean housing market, but also in the international economy
see Fig. 1.
Fig. 2 presents a synthesized causal loop diagram that repre-
sents the three key components mentioned above, as well as a
series of real-estate policies and the market responses to these
policies. In this model, there are several diagrams which include
universal economic principles connected with price, supply, and
demand. However, to reflect the specific features of the Korean
housing market, this figure also identifies several feedback loops
related to housing supply in Korea and particularly to selling
houses, which can play a key role in elucidating Korea’s housing
market mechanisms. In-depth analyses of these loops are pro-
vided in subsequent sections of the paper.
Price
As illustrated by Fig. 2, house price is determined by the supply
and demand functions. Even though extraordinary circumstances
may arise over a short-term period, house prices are ultimately
driven by these market principles. While housing supply includes
newly built housing and existing housing on sale, Housing De-
mand is derived from the sum of both actual demand and invest-
ment demand. While actual demand refers to housing demand to
meet a means of living, investment demand represents the de-
mand for the accumulation of investment properties. The results







Fig. 1. Basic housing model and its key componentsJOURNAL OF CONSTRUCTI
J. Constr. Eng. Manage. 2of surveys conducted on the determining factors of the housing
market support the decision to divide demand into actual demand
and investment demand in this research, as 61.1% of the respon-
dents claimed they would purchase houses with the intent to in-
vest.
Furthermore, overdemand, which is defined as the value de-
rived from subtracting housing supply from housing demand, de-
termines perceived existing house price and the sales rate of
newly built housing. While perceived existing house price is
transformed into existing house price after the time horizon for
existing house price passes, sales rate affects sales unit price of
newly built housing via the risk of dead stock. sales unit price is
also based on suppliers’ expected sales unit price, which is based
on production cost Sterman 2000.
In the Korean housing industry, there is a linking mechanism
between newly built housing sales and existing house prices. In-
deed, in previous research, it has been verified that if the sales
prices of new housing increase, demand will shift to existing
Fig. 2. Causal loop for Korean housing market and house price de-











































































d.housing stock as substitute goods, causing a correlative increase
in housing prices Hur and Ha 1990; Hur 1991, 1993. These
observations suggest that the sale of newly built housing and the
existing housing markets are closely interrelated. This mechanism
is analyzed using R1 in Fig. 3. If the sales unit price goes up, this
will cause an increase in the potential value of existing housing
stocks with similar housing attractiveness. As a direct conse-
quence, the existing house price will be increased via homeown-
ers’ perceptions of the value of their houses. If the expected profit
from newly built housing trading is achieved, speculative demand
i.e., investment demand will be incurred. Indeed, the survey
results related to future house price volatility demonstrate that
83.3% of the survey respondents have the expectancy of trading
profit production when house prices show an upward tendency.
This increased demand will again lead to an increase in sales unit
price, therefore forming a set of self-reinforcing loops R1. In the
survey, 91.7% of the respondents answered that there is a rein-
forcing connection between existing house prices and sales unit
price.
Supply
The Korean housing supply system is substantially different from
that of other countries for several reasons. First of all, the major-
ity of private housing in Korea is under government control, not
to mention public housing, which requires direct or indirect pub-
lic funding. Furthermore, because of policy objectives that priori-
tize meeting the demand of homeless households, supply is
mostly in the form of newly built housing. Lastly, there are mini-
mal differences between the public and private housing supply
systems. As a result, the housing market’s self-regulating func-
tions do not work properly because of excessive government in-
tervention in the housing supply Kim and Lee 2005. However,
this particular perspective is examined because the legitimacy of
the supply market function has become increasingly accepted
with the general understanding that policy success, in reality, is
heavily dependent on market responses. Therefore, working from
within this context, the Korean housing supply mechanism will
now be analyzed from a private developer’s perspective.
Fig. 4 illustrates the private developer’s pricing stratagem. For
instance, as seen in this figure, the balancing feedback initiated by
Fig. 3. Linkage mechanism between newly built housing sales and
house pricessales unit price B1-a governs the volume of newly built housing.
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tion cost, expected sales profit and, in turn, the volume of newly
built housing provided by the private developer, will increase. As
a result, once the total housing supply exceeds housing demand,
housing sales will be decreased. This reduces the expected sales
rate of future housing projects in the area, which consequently
forces the private developer to lower sales unit price by increas-
ing the risk of dead stock. This loop effect demonstrates that if a
higher expected development profit is expected, the developer can
risk increasing sales prices.
Furthermore, there is another balancing feedback initiated by
the sales unit price B1-b. If the sales prices of the developer’s
new houses are cheaper than the prices of existing houses in the
same area, the expected profit from newly built house trading
i.e., the profit gained after selling a newly purchased home, and
also the difference between the potential value and actual price of
new housing will increase. This subsequently increases housing
demand, fueling consumers’ investment demand. Then, develop-
ers’ expectation of the occupancy rate of their product is in-
creased, and they will set a higher sales unit price accordingly.
The B1-a and B1-b loops represent housing market mecha-
nisms that are generated by a private developer’s pricing strategy.
These loops indicate how this particular strategy impacts supply
volume, demand volume, and sales price. However, when the
ceiling price system was introduced into the Korean housing
market in 1988, such self-managed mechanisms were severely
damaged.
The volume of existing housing on sale, on the other hand, is
governed by balancing feedback B1-c, as shown in Fig. 5. If
existing house price in one area is relatively higher than neigh-
boring areas, expected profit from existing housing on sale will be
decreased. In this case, apartment owners will be motivated to sell
their homes; this will eventually lead to the increase of existing
housing on sale. as a consequence, once housing supply exceeds
housing demand, perceived existing house price will be de-
creased, ultimately transforming existing house price.
Existing house price is also governed by another balancing
feedback system B1-d. If existing house price is lower in a
particular area than neighboring areas, it is assumed that expected
profit from existing house trading will be increased. This increase
will, in turn, stimulate investment demand, consequently leading
to the increase of housing demand. Then, homeowners will per-
ceive that the value of their homes is greater than their existing
Fig. 4. Newly built housing supplyprices, and they will accordingly set higher existing house prices.












































































According to the theoretical approach of housing demand, in-
creases in purchasing power, urban and total population, and
households, are essential in boosting housing demand. To model
these dynamics, the size of the homeless population and the pur-
chasing power derived from capital gains are targeted as two ad-
ditional factors that impact demand besides housing price. As
shown in Fig. 6, an increase in sales unit price, existing house
price, and homeownership rate will reduce actual demand, which
is supported by adequate financial means. On the other hand,
decreases in housing demand will eventually lower the sales unit
price of newly built housing along the series of causal links
already discussed, activating a self-balancing market mechanism
B2-a. A decrease in housing demand is also transmitted to other
areas, decreasing the existing house prices, which again amplifies
actual demand B2-b.
In contrast, as shown in Fig. 7, the expected price difference
i.e., expected profit from newly built house trading will continue
to widen as long as expensive existing housing i.e., house price
coexists with relatively cheap newly built housing i.e., sales unit
price. This results in a self-reinforcing loop R2-a. In this case,
both house price and investment demand form an ascending
curve. In particular, if the sales price is not linked to the price of
Fig. 5. Existing housing on sale supply
Fig. 6. Actual housing demandJOURNAL OF CONSTRUCTI
J. Constr. Eng. Manage. 2existing housing stocks e.g., under the ceiling price system, the
market power derived from the R2-a loop strengthens over time.
However, if the sales price is self-regulated e.g., if the B1-a loop
effect is activated, the expected price difference might be dimin-
ished as suppliers increase sales unit price; this will reduce specu-
lative demand and ultimately weaken market power along the
same R1-a loop path.
There is also a self-reinforcing loop associated with the invest-
ment demand for existing housing. If perceived existing house
price increases because of overdemand, a time gap i.e., time
horizon for existing house price is required before this increase is
reflected in actual existing housing price. This time gap creates
expected profit from existing house trading, which consequently
leads to the amplification of both investment demand and housing
demand. When perceived existing house price is not reflected in
existing house price i.e., long time horizon for existing house
price, investment demand increases because it is generated by
expected profit from existing housing trading. However, as exist-
ing house price only fully reflects perceived existing house price
after a time horizon has passed, an increase in existing house
price will decrease the expected transaction interest, which is a
self-regulated market function B1-d.
Policy Analysis
So far, with a particular focus on housing supply, demand, and
price, the basic structure of the Korean housing market has been
interrogated and the dynamic feedback loops associated with this
particular market, and how they function, have been illustrated.
Based on the results of this analysis, Korea’s current housing
policies—specifically the 831 Countermeasures and the debates
surrounding it—will now be examined focusing on the capital
region, which has maintained the normal housing demand with a
high level of housing attractiveness. Through a case study, this
research analyzes the effects of the 831 Countermeasures’ details
on a case by case basis. Then, the compound effects of the gov-
ernment policies are illustrated by the behaviors of related causal
loops. Fig. 8 presents a diagrammatical expression of the key
points and mechanisms of each policy of the 831 Countermea-
sures, while Table 2 provides the details of each countermeasure.
This paper focuses on the Cost-sale price linkage system, New
town development, and Tax increases, which are major factors of
Fig. 7. Investment housing demandthe 831 Countermeasures.











































































d.Cost-Sale Price Linkage System
Applied from 1989 to 1998, the cost linkage system was based on
the popular belief that the unconditional liberalization of sales
prices will increase house prices Kim and Kim 1998. The 831
Countermeasures’ readoption of the cost linkage system can be
Fig. 8. 831 Countermeasures applied
Table 2. Main Contents of the 831 Countermeasures
Division
House Transparency Report duty of real transacti
of transaction Lower the boom on mediati
House supply Mini new city new adminis
New town development
Public sector role Develop public sector Inclu
Enforcement of bond biddin
Period extension of the resa
Residing stability Incentive system of tax and
Support of loan for persons











7Note: Source: Ministry of Finance and Economy MOFE, August 31, 2005.
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J. Constr. Eng. Manage. 2understood as based on a similar notion, and this decision empha-
sizes the Korean government’s prevailing enthusiasm for supply-
ing low-income citizens who otherwise would be without
housing with small-sized apartments at relatively cheap prices.
Nevertheless, after a reconsideration of the policy model seen in





ers and speculators Ordinary
town 2006
2006
city of Pan-Gyo 2006
m and basic cost linkage system 2006
tation 5→10 years 2006
rea ratio 2006
sing first house 2005.10
tax as per household 2006
of the taxation standard house: 900 million
illion, vacant lot: 600 million→300 million
2006
ion of the supremum of tax 2006
the effective tax rates 1% by 2009 2006–2009
on of taxes of real transaction price 2007
y tax to those possessing 2 houses per household
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d.Fig. 8, it must be reiterated that such makeshift measures only
bring a short-term stabilization of housing prices, which results in
adverse effects on the real-estate market over the long-term
Table 3.
As demonstrated by Fig. 8, a controlling mechanism geared
toward the establishment of a sales price ceiling might contribute
to an incremental increase in actual demand. Furthermore, if this
increase continues, lowered interest rates and the expansion of
housing funds can accelerate this active demand i.e., the cost-
sale price linkage system activates the B1-a and B1-b loops seen
in Fig. 4. However, if increases in housing prices are due to
incongruence between housing supply and demand, actual de-
mand will be reduced see B2-b in Fig. 6. That said, as sales
prices are controlled, house prices will increase to the point at
which transaction interest i.e., expected profit from newly built
house trading is maximized. Under such circumstances, “specu-
lative” investors can control the housing market see R2 in
Fig. 3.
However, from a supplier’s perspective, controlling mecha-
nisms might cause less enthusiasm. Indeed, when such a mecha-
nism is in place, it is assumed that developers will not be as eager
to participate in the housing market, as they will not be able to
benefit from a wide margin between development costs and con-
trolled prices i.e., they will be unable to control the B1-a loop




• Application of cost-sale pric
which was applied only if les
to every house in the resident
by the government
• Cost-sale price linkage syste
house is set by the sum of lan
standard building costs, which
government
• The Bond Bidding System i
houses that are larger than 25




• Planning to construct 300,00
until 2010
• For this purpose, the develo
around Seoul and a new town
planned
Tax increase Holding tax
property tax
• By adjusting the standard of
ownership tax, the number of
ownership tax has increased b
• Increase of holding tax rate
gross holding tax amount
Transaction tax • Impose tax based on the act
rather than the declared value
than the actual market price. 
transaction tax increases signi
• Existing tax rate is less than
of whether 1 household owns
than 2 houses; however, for 1
more than 2 houses, the new
heavy tax rate of more than 5
Note: A pyeong=3.058 m2.seen in Fig. 4. Consequently, if developers are not guaranteed a
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J. Constr. Eng. Manage. 2sufficient profit, the supply of small-sized apartments will be re-
duced, therefore resulting in an increase in the prices of both new
and already-built small-sized apartments. Another outcome of
such a context is developers opting to concentrate on the devel-
opment of medium or large-sized apartments, which will presum-
ably yield higher profits. If such a trend continues, the
bipolarization of the housing supply market will become even
more emphasized.
“New Town” Development
“New town” development is inextricably linked to housing issues
in Korea, as illustrated by the Korean government’s prompt deci-
sion to build new towns around Seoul in order to stabilize house
prices. Although this strategy has been generally accepted as the
best way to expand the housing supply in the short term, it has
still incited an unending debate. For instance, opposition groups
have argued that leaf-frogging development unaccompanied with
the construction of basic infrastructures, such as roads and con-
venience facilities, does not disperse housing demand aimed at
the Seoul and Capital Region.
The R2-a loop in Fig. 7 demonstrates that Korean new town
development is not linked to the market mechanism. Here, it is
assumed that both floating funds and implicit speculative demand




• Cost-sale price linkage system→sales unit price
decrease→potential value of existing housing
decrease→perceived existing house price





• Cost-sale price linkage system→sales unit price
decrease→expected sales profit decrease→newly




• Cost-sale price linkage system→sales unit price
decrease→actual demand increase
• Cost-sale price linkage system→expected profit
from newly built house trading increase
→ investment Demand increase
ses per year • New town development→newly built housing
increase→housing supply increase→perceived
existing house price decrease→existing house
price decrease government intention





• Holding tax increase→ investment demand
decrease government intention






• Transaction tax increase→expected profit from
existing house trading decrease→ investment
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d.ally want to enjoy the realization of the expected transaction in-
terest, it becomes essential that the government construct new
towns with greater housing attractiveness. As a result, new town
developments will inevitably provoke excessive competition for
brand-new housing with high attractiveness. Furthermore, if the
government appropriates a higher unit sales price in new town
developments, it seems inevitable that there will be a price trans-
fer toward regions with more attractive housing see R1 in Fig. 3.
Tax Increases
One of the 831 Countermeasures’ most publicized aspects are the
tax increases for real-estate purchases, capital gains, and transac-
tions. The government not only predicted that increased real-
estate taxes e.g., holding and transfer taxes would reduce
opportunities to profit from home ownership, they also expected
that these taxes would oppress speculative demand MOFE 2005.
However, if such a trend continues, because holding a house en-
tails a tax burden for the housing holder, more houses might
continue to be put on the market i.e., an increase in existing
housing on sale over the long-term, potentially resulting in a
drop in house prices i.e., the government’s intention to control
the R2-b loop’s function seen in Fig. 7.
However, it is crucial that this so-called “benevolent” housing
policy does not, in fact, differentiate the supply-housing market
from the demand-housing market. From a supplier’s perspective,
increased holding taxation will increase the housing supply in
regions with relatively low housing attractiveness. However, in
regions with relatively high housing attractiveness such as Kang-
nam, where house prices have rapidly increased, the tax burden
derived from this increased taxation will discourage homeowners
in Kangnam to put their houses on the market. This, of course,
will result in a decrease in sales stocks. As well, because this tax
policy imposes a high tax rate on multiple homeowners, this de-
crease in housing supply will be heightened.
From a demander’s perspective, on the other hand, speculative
and total demand will be reduced because hefty transaction taxes
will inevitably reduce the expected transaction difference. How-
ever, in the case of regions with a relatively high housing attrac-
tiveness, potential demand will be maintained, even as housing
demand decreases; this is due to the scarcity value of the regional
attributes and high housing attractiveness. Consequently, as the
government intended, increased taxation did lower housing prices
in regions of relatively low housing attractiveness due to the in-
crease in supply and decrease in demand. However, in the case of
regions with relatively high housing attractiveness, which are the
main target of the 831 Countermeasures, the impact of increased
taxation has not been so great. This is because the decrease in
supply i.e., existing housing on sale exceeds the decrease in
demand.
Fig. 9 shows house price volatility in the capital region and all
of Korea. This national data are presented by price index, com-
pared with house prices in January 2006 i.e., the Price index in
January 2006=100. Similarly, Fig. 10 illustrates the volatility of
housing transactions 5 months after the government announced
the 831 Countermeasures. As previously noted, over the long-
term, there was a continuous increase in house prices and little
volatility in housing transactions. On the contrary, in the capital
region, which maintained high housing attractiveness and a hous-
ing demand increase, there was a decrease in existing housing on
sale because of the holding tax burden. Therefore, it can be ob-
served that the policy results in potential increases in housing
prices due to the supply and demand functions.
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While an examination of the theoretical basis and positive and
negative aspects of the 831 Countermeasures certainly clarifies
the aims of the government policy, the practical applicability of
such a policy must also be rigorously examined. As well, it must
be taken into account that the housing market is an organic and
complex mechanism driven by a series of feedback loops, and
especially for the purpose of reliable market forecasting, the loops
that are most prevalent in the total system must be identified. To
this end, this research uses system dynamics to simulate the 831
Countermeasures for Kangnam, a neighborhood in the south of
Seoul, which has maintained the highest level of housing attrac-
tiveness for the past several decades and has thus been blamed for
driving up Korean housing prices.
Fig. 8 illustrates the 831 Countermeasures’ basic policy
mechanism for Kangnam. First, the purpose of the increased
transaction taxation was to cut expected profit from existing
house trading, which, in turn, was meant to decrease investment
demand and also reduce the existing housing on sale because high
expected trading profits are due to continually increasing housing
prices in Kangnam. Then, the increased transfer taxation and
holding taxation were meant to decrease housing demand, par-
ticularly in Kangnam, as Kangnam’s housing attractiveness and
scarcity value will continue to be maintained and most likely
increase, and imputed demand will continue to be maintained
provided that trading profits exceed the transfer income tax.
As a result of Kangnam’s maintained housing attractiveness/
scarcity, diminished supply and demand will reduce the total vol-
ume of housing transactions, thus leading to an increase in the
time horizon for existing house price. This implies that the wid-
ened gap between perceived existing house price and existing
house price will amplify the effect of the R2-b loop. In other
words, a certain amount of time must pass so that perceived
changes in housing demand may be reflected in housing prices;
however, due to the contraction of housing transactions, this will
lead to an amplification of the change in investment demand.
Fig. 9. Korean house price index











































































d.Under such circumstances, and owing to sales price increases
in surrounding new town areas, it is quite possible that Kang-
nam’s potential value will continue to soar. Consequently, the
R2-b loop would be activated, resulting in increasing investment
demand generating higher perceived existing house prices in
Kangnam. The aforementioned low volume of transactions would
greatly amplify the effect of the R2-b loop, thus increasing the
probability that Kangnam house prices will be boosted under the
831 Countermeasures.
In fact, after the Korean government proposed the 831 Coun-
termeasures, the price gap between Kangnam and other regions
widened from August 2005 to February 2006 The KB Bank
2006. Fortunately for the upper class in Kangnam, the limited
sales volume of housing was virtually immune to the taxation
policy implemented by the government. Ultimately, these trends
have resulted in the deepening of housing bipolarization and class
disparities already evident in Korean society.
Summary and Conclusions
Using a qualitative system dynamics model, this study has at-
tempted to elucidate and analyze the impact of the 831 Counter-
measures on key components of Korea’s housing market. Causal
loop analyses of the housing sector have indicated that the hous-
ing market is run by house prices that are self-regulated by supply
and demand, and particularly under the influence of balancing
loops such as the supply controlling loops B1-a, B1-b, B1-c,
B1-d and demand controlling loops B2-a, B2-b. Also, when
reinforcing loops related to house price and investment demand
are self-regulated in the affirmative directions, the housing market
will become stable with active housing transactions. Conversely,
if reinforcing loops are caught in a vicious cycle, the government
can intervene in the housing market by stimulating the reinforcing
loops’ operation to change direction. In this respect, the implica-
tions of this policy, as obtained from this research, are summa-
rized as follows.
First, the cost-sale price linkage system can strengthen the
activation of the balancing loops B2-b related to housing supply.
Nevertheless, the vicious cycle of R1 loops connected with hous-
ing price volatility could grow worse. Similarly, new town devel-
opment could also deepen the negative side effects of the R1
loops. In fact, it will take some time before that particular policy,
new town development, can have a positive influence on the bal-
ancing loops linked with housing supply. Moreover, when the
government intervenes in the housing market to regulate invest-
ment demands by increasing taxes, they should wait for balancing
loops to dominate the market, even though price and speculative
demand related to the reinforcing loop R1 will be increased in
the short term.
Using system dynamics modeling to perform qualitative analy-
sis, this study also highlights the need to devise policy alterna-
tives that are based on regional disparities in housing
attractiveness and housing prices. These factors must not be dis-
missed. For this purpose, housing planning should prioritize up-
grading the housing attractiveness of a target area, not the housing
volume of that area. Finally, new town projects should not be
implemented solely for the purpose of stabilizing house prices,JOURNAL OF CONSTRUCTI
J. Constr. Eng. Manage. 2but also to provide a good dwelling environment for residents.
Indeed, increasing housing volume cannot be the fundamental
solution to such complex problems, for such an approach will
only lead to the gradual deterioration of dwelling environments.
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